SHOULD WE ABANDON THE MONROE DOCTRINE?

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"The Monroe Doctrine, or the doctrine of the dual political organization of the nations of the earth, is a barbaric stumbling-block in the way of enlightened international policy." So wrote the late William Graham Sumner, in an essay on "Earth Hunger," in 1897.

At that time, very little attention was paid to his remarks. Professor Sumner had a way of being many years ahead of public opinion in his attitude toward political and economic policies.

During the past few months the number of people who have come to take an unfriendly attitude toward the Monroe Doctrine has very greatly increased. True, this national shibboleth is still a plank in the platforms of our great national parties. In many quarters it is still a rallying cry. A great chain of newspapers, extending from San Francisco to Boston, edited by the most highly paid editorial writer of the day, constantly refers to the Monroe Doctrine as something sacred and precious, like the Declaration of Independence. Other powerful newspapers, less popular in their appeal, but no less powerful in their influence, still resent any attack on what is considered by them the most essential feature of our foreign policy. And they continue to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, while at the same time they try to explain away its disagreeable features.

A recent editorial in a journal devoted to the interests of the army and navy, in vigorously denouncing the present attacks being made on the Monroe Doctrine, and calling loudly on patriotic Americans to see to it that no academic sentimentalists were allowed to weaken our national defenses, declared that without the Monroe Doctrine, we could not hold the Panama Canal!
It would have been just as logical to say that without the Monroe Doctrine we could not hold Hawaii, or Key West, or Boston harbor. The Panama Canal is one of the possessions of the United States. Its defense is a national right and a national duty. In defending the Panama Canal as in defending Key West or Boston harbor, we have back of us the most universally accepted principles of international law. In upholding the Monroe Doctrine, on the other hand, we are merely upholding what has been believed for many years to be a useful foreign policy, but one that has no standing in international law, and is, in fact, neither law nor doctrine but merely a declaration of policy having to do with our relations with foreign nations.

Consequently, in considering the question as the whether we should abandon the Monroe Doctrine or not, we must first clear our minds of any idea that the maintenance or abandonment of this policy is in any way synonymous with the maintenance or abandonment of our national defenses, be they in Hawaii, Boston harbor, or the Panama Canal. Of course, it is perfectly true that to maintain a vigorous foreign policy and one that is at all unpopular, means the maintenance of an efficient army and navy. But without any vigorous foreign policy, we should, at the same time, need an army and a navy, and both ought to be efficient for the same reason that every city needs an efficient police force.

In considering the advisability of abandoning the Monroe Doctrine, let us attempt to get clearly in mind exactly what is meant by the Monroe Doctrine. We shall find that at different periods of our history, it has meant very different things. When it was promulgated by President Monroe in 1823, it meant that we were afraid that the rising wave of monarchy and despotism in Europe might overwhelm the struggling republics in the New World. We were, in a sense, in the position of the big brother on the edge of the swimming pool, who sees his little brothers swimming under water and about to come to the surface; and who also sees a couple of bullies getting ready to duck them before they can get their breath. As a matter of fact, this was
the only republic, at that time, that had come to the surface, scrambled on to the bank, and shown itself able to stand on its own legs. The little fellows in Spanish-America were swimming hard, but they had not got their heads above water. We believed it to be for our interests to see that they had a square deal and were not interfered with as they came to the surface. We promulgated a high-minded, unselfish policy, without a thought of gaining prestige or power in Latin-America. We bravely warned the nations of the continent of Europe not to attempt to inflict their system of government on any land in the western hemisphere, where a democratic or republican form of government had established itself.

From such a high-minded and altruistic position at this, it is a far cry to the connotation which goes with the Monroe Doctrine in the minds of many American citizens of today. Our people have been taught by jingoistic politicians, like the heelers of Tammany Hall, to believe that the Monroe Doctrine means that it is our duty to keep America in order; that it is our policy to allow Europe to have nothing to say about the American republics, and that it would be a national disgrace, almost unthinkable, for us to abandon this sacred shibboleth. It was a Tammany Hall orator, according to Professor Hart, who said, "Tammany Hall is a benevolent institution; Tammany Hall is a patriotic institution; Tammany Hall has the honor of being the first to propose that immortal Monroe Doctrine which blesses and revivifies the world."

And it was a former Tammany politician, who, on being questioned in regard to our present policy with Mexico, stated, a few days ago, that under the Monroe Doctrine it was our duty to go in and annex Mexico, and the sooner we did it, the better.

It is a far cry from the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the Monroeism of our politicians and newspapers at the present day. In 1823, this declaration of foreign policy made a profound impression on Europe, and won us the gratitude and the eulogies of the Latin-American republics. At the present time, there is no question that the Monroe Doc-
trine is a cause of world-wide irritation and is almost universally hated throughout Latin-America. In the words of a careful student of Pan-American affairs, who has lived many years in various parts of Spanish America, "the two principal results of the Monroe Doctrine are: intense hatred of the United States on the part of powerful and self-respecting South American nations, able and willing to meet their responsibilities to the countries to whom they are under obligations; and an attempt at evasion of these responsibilities by other Latin-American countries, who, while using the Doctrine where they think they can for such a purpose, equally hate the originators of it."

Contrast this with that memorable sentence in Mr. Cleveland's message to Congress regarding the Venezuela boundary dispute, in which he said that the Monroe Doctrine "was intended to apply to every stage of our national life, and cannot become obsolete while our republic endures."

This was quoted by the editor of the New York Times in a recent article in the Century, in which the part played by the Monroe Doctrine in the Venezuela dispute was carefully brought out. In a recent number of the Times, in an editorial discussion of the present writer's proposal to regard the Monroe Doctrine as obsolete, it was admitted that the Monroe Doctrine was, as a matter of fact, a purely selfish policy. These were the words used:

The Monroe Doctrine was declared by us with reference to our own interests, and is maintained for no other reason. It was not declared with direct regard or thought of the interests of the weaker republics of the continent, and it will be maintained—or abandoned—with more thought of our interests than of theirs.

If that is the ablest defence which can be made for the doctrine in its present form, it is not surprising that we find so much opposition to it on the part of our southern neighbors. General Reyes, former president of the Republic of Colombia, said recently:

Having for many years closely followed, step by step, the development of the American republics and the convulsions of their ardent and vexed democracies, I am more than ever convinced that unity of action with the United States is necessary to in-
tiate the advent of that glorious future to which they are so manifestly entitled. But that unity of action can only be accomplished by the removal of the causes which have led to the prevailing doubts, jealousies, and suspicions.

In my opinion, the Panama Canal will solve many of the difficulties which owe their existence to the present lack of intercourse between the people of the north and those of the south, but even that beneficial change of conditions will not serve by itself to eradicate the evils of the past. There must be a wider recognition of the fact that the relations of the United States with the Latin republics are those of a friendly, powerful neighbor, with no other objects than the advantages to be gained from the ties of sisterhood and the extension of commerce. There must be a saner propaganda as to the inalienable sovereign rights and complete independence of even the smallest of the Latin States. There must be no "big stick," and no such use of the Monroe Doctrine as to make it an instrument of terror to the smaller republics, and a subject for ridicule in the greater countries of the South.

The more advanced Latin nations appreciate and sympathize with the benevolent designs and objects of that doctrine, as is shown by the formulation of their own doctrine, intended to protect the smaller states against the employment of armed force by foreign nations for the collection of contractual debts. *But they resent the spirit of domination and tutelage which implies that they need the protection of the United States against foreign aggression.* (The italics are mine.)

It is easy to understand the cause of such remarks when one calls to mind the thoughtless jingoism of some of our newspapers and the more intelligent selfishness of some of our leading editorial writers.

It would be easy to multiply quotations from North American writers and newspapers which justify the fears and hatred of Latin America. And it would be equally easy to gather many paragraphs from Spanish and French authors to illustrate what forms this distrust and hatred take. I have already called attention to a number of these in the little book just referred to.¹

Why is it that it is so difficult for us to formulate an answer to the question as to what the Monroe Doctrine really means? Because there are probably no two words in American history which have been more variously interpreted, which have meant more things to more people, and which have been more highly praised by some and more bitterly

¹The Monroe Doctrine an Obsolete Shibboleth, Yale Univ. Press.
condemned by others. What is the reason of this confusion?

I believe that the reason is that these two words "Monroe Doctrine" have come to be used by us in place of two other words that are less interesting and less significant, namely, "foreign policy." Our foreign policy is the Monroe Doctrine. Whatever our foreign policy happens to be for the moment, it is called the "Monroe Doctrine." Do we decide to intervene in Cuba, we do not say that we believe it to be for our best interests as a nation to overstep the bounds of international law and to carry our intervention into a neighboring territory. We wave a banner and call it the Monroe Doctrine. Are we too busy at home to intervene between Spain and Chile when they go to war and when Spain bombards the port of Valparaiso? We declare that the Monroe Doctrine does not mean that we shall interfere in any righteous war. Do we wish to take any part of Spanish-American territory which we need or which is being badly governed? We refer our actions to the Monroe Doctrine. It is no wonder that Monroeism, as it is called in South America, has come to mean to the Latin-American mind interference, intervention, tutelage and patronizing insolence. This connotation does us infinite harm.

The truth is, instead of facing squarely the question of what is the best foreign policy for us to follow, we cloud our minds with this national shibboleth; we remember that it is nearly one hundred years old; we believe that it has done a great deal of good in keeping Europe from crushing the life out of incipient South American republics; we feel that it is a benevolent institution, and, therefore, we brand whatever selfish or unselfish policy we adopt for the moment with the words "Monroe Doctrine."

It would seem as though for the very sake of clarifying our own ideas and placing our foreign policy on a logical foundation, it would be well for us to abandon a combination of words which stands for so many different things to so many different people.

It can be fairly said that the United States has had as
many ideals and has fought for as high ideals as any nation in history. The calm judgment of our foreign critics sometimes is willing to admit that we have been more idealistic than any modern nation. We once shed a vast amount of blood and treasure in order to suppress an economic institution called slavery, largely because it was not our ideal of the right way to progress toward higher things. We went to war with Spain largely for the sake of giving Cuba her freedom, and then, contrary to the belief of most of the world who were looking on, we did not keep Cuba, but gave her independence. Knowing this and other things of a similar nature, we sometimes flatter ourselves that our motives are always correct, and chiefly idealistic. And the worst of it is, we sometimes so blind ourselves with the dazzling spectacle of our unselfishness that we cannot see our selfishness. In the case of Cuba, for instance, we were so pleased with our unselfish sacrifices, that we shut our eyes to the fact that while we were giving Cuba freedom, we were taking Porto Rico and the Philippines and Guam, and a very useful naval base at the east end of Cuba, and putting them in our pockets. The world did not say that the Spanish-American war gave us no reward for our pains.

Before deciding whether we ought to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and considering what ought to be our policy for the future, let us review a few of the more striking features of our foreign policy since 1823.

For twenty years after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine, we were regarded with extraordinary friendliness throughout Spanish-America. Our willingness to recognize the independence of the newly-fledged republics; our willingness to protect them from European aggression, and our generous non-interference with them in the time of their greatest weakness, earned us their gratitude. But in 1846 came the war with Mexico, one of those independent republics that we were going to protect. We had stated in the original Monroe Doctrine that it was the true policy of the United States to leave the new governments of Spanish-America to themselves, in the hope that other powers would
pursue the same course. And yet, we did not hesitate, at the conclusion of the war with Mexico, to take away from her nearly one half her area. It did not help matters that a year or two later, gold was discovered in California. It did not increase our popularity in Spanish-America when it appeared that we were getting enormously wealthy out of the gold and silver mines in California and Nevada, which we had so recently taken by force from Mexico, even though we had paid $15,000,000 for what we took. It may be replied that it was far better for California and Nevada that we should have taken them, and that we could afford to stand the unpopularity that this engendered in South America. Granting for the sake of argument that this is true, why not admit frankly that when we took California and Nevada, we went contrary to the principles laid down by President Monroe in his famous message of 1823.

In 1898, we went to war with Spain, and eventually took away all her American possessions. We believed ourselves justified in so doing. I hold no brief against the justification of that war. It was undoubtedly a good thing for Spain. Many Spaniards will admit this today. Their country has been stronger and their economic condition has improved since they lost their foreign possessions. But President Monroe had said that "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered and shall not interfere." Is it not perfectly evident that in 1898 we regarded the Monroe Doctrine as outgrown, and said to ourselves that we could afford to disregard one of the most positive sentences in the original declaration of President Monroe? Why should we still feel that there is something so sacred in this national shibboleth of ours that, although we have repeatedly gone contrary to it when it suited us to do so, we must still cling to it as a precious thing, without which our own independence would be in danger of being lost?

In 1906, Secretary Root made his well-known tour of South America. It has been said that this tour was made necessary owing to the fear of the United States aroused throughout South America, by some of President Roose-
velt's messages to Congress, in which he took pains to re-
assert the Monroe Doctrine, and in which he accepted, quite
logically, the very great responsibilities which the main-
tenance of a policy of "America for the Americans" en-
tailed upon us. He had said in 1905:

When we announce a policy, such as the Monroe Doctrine,
we thereby commit ourselves to the consequences of the policy,
and those consequences from time to time alter. It is out of the
question to claim a right and then to shirk the responsibility for
its exercise. Not only we, but all American republics who are
benefited by the existence of the Doctrine, must recognize the
obligations each nation is under as regards foreign peoples no less
than its duty to insist upon its own rights.

After the opening of the third session of the Fifty-Eighth
Congress, Mr. Roosevelt had said:

Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count
upon our hearty friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how
to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and polit­
ical matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need
fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrong­
doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of
the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ulti­
mately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the
western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the
Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly,
in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exer­
cise of an international police power.

These official utterances had greatly alarmed and annoyed
the South American republics, and it was no small part of
Secretary Root's visit to quiet their fears and assure them
of the pacific quality of our intentions. So well did Mr.
Root do this, so ably had he prepared himself by the study
of South American history, so favorable an impression did
he make by his dignified and courteous bearing, and so
profound a conviction did his words convey, coming as they
did from the actual head of our department of foreign affairs,
that great good was accomplished, and an era of friendship
and good-will was ushered in.

The most striking effect of this was to be seen in Chile.
Owing to a series of misunderstandings, including the blun­
ders of an over-zealous diplomat, the wrong-headed ideas
of many American newspapers, and the seeming interference of American warships during the great Chilean civil war of 1891, we had become extremely unpopular in that vigorous republic of the South Pacific. Then had followed the deplorable Baltimore incident, when a number of our sailors on shore-leave in the port of Valparaiso, got into trouble with some of the rougher elements of the port, and a few were killed and several more wounded. We had lost our patience with what we termed Chilean dilatory conduct; we took the law into our own hands, and eventually we issued an ultimatum to Chile demanding financial redress. There was nothing for her to do but to grant our request. But the scar was long in healing, and it may fairly be said that we had less cordial friends in Chile than in any other American republic, with the possible exception of Colombia. Mr. Root's visit to South America and his able exposition of our foreign policy, changed the attitude of the Chileans to a very marked degree. They took the first opportunity of showing their change of heart.

The Fourth Latin-American Scientific Congress was due to be held in Santiago in December, 1908. Former congresses of this nature had been held in Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. The organization committee for the fourth congress was composed entirely of Chileans. They decided that in consequence of the new and friendly attitude of the United States, it would be an appropriate thing to make the Congress not Latin-American, but Pan-American, and to invite the participation of the American government, and of universities and other scientific bodies in the United States. Secretary Root saw the advantages that would accrue to the United States in properly accepting such an invitation. In accordance with his ideas, the United States congress passed a suitable appropriation to send ten delegates from this country to Chile. These delegates were received with the utmost courtesy and given the best of everything. It was with difficulty that they avoided offence in declining a few of the many honors showered upon them. At the end of the month which they spent in Chile, it is safe to say that the relations between Chile and the
United States were more cordial than they had ever been before. Washington was selected as the place of meeting for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress, and October, 1912, was designated as the proper time for it to meet. It has not met yet. (November, 1913.)

The United States congress was asked by Secretary Knox for a small appropriation of $50,000, about one-half of what Chile had appropriated for the Scientific Congress, when it had met in Santiago, to provide for the expenses of the Congress that should meet in Washington in October, 1912. Unfortunately, our Congress felt too poor to grant this request, and although the appropriations which were passed footed up somewhere in the neighborhood of one billion dollars; the item of $50,000 for the Scientific Congress was struck out, and our national obligations to provide for returning the hospitality which we had received, were denied. As the result of a vigorous protest and of public sessions of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the next session of Congress the same amount was again requested and the appropriation of this amount was unanimously recommended by that committee. The passage of the appropriation, however, was lost on some flimsy technicality, and our national honor in regard to the obligations of hospitality still remains under a cloud. Apparently, it is part of our foreign policy to accept invitations to Pan-American congresses, but not to provide suitably for such congresses when they have to meet in this country. As the best-known term for our foreign policy throughout Latin-America is Monroeism, this appears to our neighbors to be one of the attributes of the Monroe Doctrine.

There was another sequel to our relations with Chile even more serious than not providing suitably for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. By sending an ultimatum demanding the immediate settlement of the Alsop claim, Secretary Knox destroyed in three minutes what Secretary Root had taken three years to build up. The delicate edifice of good-will and friendship with Chile, which had arisen from the ashes of the Baltimore episode, was destroyed because a Secretary of State felt that the claim
of a private citizen for $1,000,000 had been left too long unsettled. This is not the place to go into the details of the Alsop claim. Everyone knows that Chile inherited this debt from Bolivia. The claim was recognized, but there was postponement in its settlement. Chile avoided the dire effects of Secretary Knox's ultimatum by depositing $1,000,000 in the Bank of England, and requesting that the ownership of this sum be decided by the Hague Tribunal. At least, so it was reported in the newspapers. Such matters are too recent to make it wise for the State Department to allow its records to be used as the basis of a thorough history of that episode. But there is no question about the results. The claimant eventually got his money, and we lost the cordial friendship of Chile. In the discussion which followed in the Chilean congress, a speech was made by the aged Senator Vicente Reyes on July 26, 1911. Said Senator Reyes:

'It seems to me that no Chilean is to blame for what has taken place; every one has endeavored, in the rôle that corresponded to him, to further the public interests in the most convenient manner. The fault, the real fault—and it is necessary to declare it publicly, and I can say it better than another because I have no intervention, either in the acts of the government, or in the active political life, from which I am removed by reason of my age, so that in pronouncing my opinion, my own exclusive opinion, I compromise nobody,—I shall say, then, that the fault of all this is owing to the intemperance of the United States government that has made an excessive use of its power, treating us as barbarous tribes were treated in past times, imposing on us an ultimatum and giving us ten days in which to perform what that government believed we ought to do.

In the following year on August 2 of 1912, a resolution was introduced in the senate of the United States by Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, which has been regarded throughout Latin-America as a still further extension and interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. It was known as the Magdalena Bay resolution. The subject was so ably treated in an editorial in the American Journal of International Law (vol. 6, p. 937) that I take the liberty of quoting it in part:
Midway in the southerly third of the west coast of Lower California, and perhaps 3,000 miles from Panama, is a large bay. The back country is barren and thirsty, but on the shore and off it is moss which contains a dye and fish. Lumber and cattle are said to be possibilities also. An American company secured here from Mexico a large tract of land, several million acres, which border on the bay and run back from it. This country was unprofitable. Its chief creditor, a New Hampshire lumberman, had taken it over and tried to secure himself by making a sale to certain Japanese subjects. Before concluding any bargain, however, his agent very properly consulted the United States Department of State to learn its attitude. This was adverse, it being aware of the outcry sure to be made if a Japanese coaling, fishery, or other station or colony were to be established on our side of the Pacific. Nor did Mr. Knox look with more favor upon a sale limiting the ownership of the Japanese to a minority. The owner and creditor of the concession seem to have sought Japanese aid in colonization because no other labor there was available. The Japanese government had nothing whatever to do with the scheme. Moreover, by Mexican law no concession holds good under heavy penalty, if transfer is sought by the concessionaires to a foreign government.

This was the situation then, when the susceptibilities of the Senate were aroused last July, and Mr. Lodge introduced the following resolution:

Resolved: That when any harbor or other place in the American continent is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes might threaten the communications or the safety of the United States, the government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another government not American as to give that government practical power of control for national purposes.

It is understood that in secret session for the last word but one "national" was substituted "naval or military."

A Senate resolution is an expression of its opinion. This resolution was intended to be an announcement of national policy to foreign powers. It was introduced after information had been sought from the President on the subject. This went to show that the conduct of other powers in regard to those lands had been entirely correct. In the discussion which led up to and which followed the introduction of this resolution it appeared that its mover chose not to regard it as an extension of the Monroe Doctrine, but as based upon the law of right of self-defense which is fundamental, the Agadir incident being a precedent. But in Africa, the German action was official, governmental; whereas at Magdalena Bay, as Senator Rayner had well brought out in May, it was a question of private commercial use only. Has the United States a right to assume that private commercial use of such a harbor as this, could be so easily converted into government use as to
warrant its prohibition before any sign whatever of abuse or of
danger was visible? That the Senate so believes is clear, for it
passed the Lodge resolution. That the legal mind shares this
view is not so clear. Let us state it in general terms. On the
ground of self-defense a state may forbid its neighbor to sell lands
of strategic value to the private subjects of a third power, there
being no act, but mere suspicion to warrant the fear that the third
power will make sinister use of its subjects' property. What
becomes of the sovereign right of the neighbor to dispose of its
lands, for commercial development? If the principle of self-de-
fense is unduly stretched, will it not break down and become
ridiculous? Is an attitude of constant suspicion consistent with
international good-will?

This new phase of our foreign policy, which aroused
such remarks as the foregoing in the United States, was,
as might be suspected, treated even more vehemently, not
only in Latin-America, but also in Europe. In La Re-
vista de America for September, 1912, Sr. José de Astorga,
commented as follows (I give a free translation):

The Monroe Doctrine has just suffered a transformation for
the benefit of Yankee imperialism, and for the detriment and
diminution of the sovereignty of the Latin-American republics,
in the adoption by the Senate at Washington of the Lodge Reso-
lution. . . . This resolution, reduced to its simplest terms,
says that in the future the governments of the Ibero-American
republics are prohibited from negotiating with any foreign com-
panies for the cession of any lands for the purpose of merely com-
mercial or industrial ends, without the previous consent of the
White House. . . . . Without entering into any discussion
of the motives which, from the Yankee point of view, secured the
adoption of the Lodge proposal by a nearly unanimous vote [54
to 4] of the North American Senate, it is perfectly evident that
this proposal cannot lean upon the so-called Monroe Doctrine
as originally declared, and that, furthermore, it involves a most
odious and unwarranted offense against the sovereignty and the
independence of the Latin republics of the continent. . . . If
the republics which occupy the territory of America to the south
of the United States are independent nations, in full enjoyment of
their political sovereignty, and have the same title and the same
capacity in the family of nations as North America has, then neither
the Senate nor the government at Washington has the power to
proclaim before the world, as a rule of international conduct appli-
cable to the territories of foreign sovereigns, the Lodge proposal.

Anyhow, the importance of securing concerted movement and
unanimity of action among the chancellories of Latin-America
in order to offset the imperialistic action of the United States,
is urgent, and is of supreme importance. The protests of con-
fraternity, of disinterestedness, and of respect for the political sovereignty and the commercial independence of Latin-America, which the government of the United States sets forth so freely on every occasion, are not able to counteract nor to lessen the eloquence of deeds, and these are the deeds: tutelage over Cuba; the abduction of Panama; the embargo on the custom houses of Santo Domingo; economic and military intervention in Central America; the "big stick;" dollar diplomacy, and the Lodge declaration.

Here we have the Latin-American judgment on the Monroe Doctrine in a nutshell. We can on occasion make charming speeches. We can claim that our foreign policy is idealistic, and we can point to the Monroe Doctrine as evidence of our willingness to protect the weaker against the stronger. Actions speak louder than words. The fruits of our foreign policy have been the acquisition of more territory and direct interference in the affairs of our neighbors.

One of the questions for us to decide is, whether it is worth while to pretend adherence to a shibboleth which has so often spelt intervention, and which means to our neighbors in the western hemisphere that we consider it our duty to intervene whenever sufficient occasion arises.

How much do we believe in intervention?

One of our most distinguished diplomats and statesmen, the late E. J. Phelps, delivered an address in the city of Brooklyn on March 30, 1896, which dealt with the Monroe Doctrine at a time when we had been drawn dangerously near to a war with Great Britain over the Venezuela boundary. That distinguished publicist treated our right to interfere in the affairs of other nations in no uncertain terms. The fact that he was selected by President Cleveland as our minister at the Court of St. James, and that he filled that post with marked success, is sufficient excuse for quoting him at the present time, when once again we have a distinguished Democrat at the head of the nation. Said Mr. Phelps:

International law is international morality and justice, formulated by the general consent of civilized men. That is its basis and its sanction. The claim that Americans are in any
respect above or beyond this law of the civilized world, or that we are invested with authority to interfere in the affairs of other nations in which we are in no way concerned, merely because the location of the dispute is in South America, are propositions that will find no favor among just or thoughtful men. We have no protectorate over South American nations, and do not assume any responsibility in their behalf. Our own rights there, as elsewhere, it is to be hoped, we shall never fail to maintain. But those rights have their foundation and their limit in the settled law to which we are subject as all other nations are, and which is as necessary to us as to them.

And when we undertake to assert that we are not bound by that law, and care nothing for the opinion of the world; that we are Americans and monarchs all of us, we survey; and that we are going to control the part of this hemisphere that does not belong to us, regardless of the rights of those to whom it does belong, merely for the sake of doing it, and because we think we are strong enough, we adopt the language of the bully, and shall certainly encounter, if that is persisted in, the bully’s retribution.

Surely, with these words ringing in our ears, we do not wish to stand by a policy which can be so construed as to spell interference and intervention.

It is difficult to exaggerate the present attitude of South America towards the Monroe Doctrine. As late as September 13, 1913, La Prensa, one of the leading papers of Peru and the principal supporter of the present government, prints in the most conspicuous place in the paper a letter from a Chilean newspaper correspondent in New York. The headlines are as follows: “Studying the Situation in Mexico.” The Chilean journalist, Montcalm, speaks from New York. He calls on Latin-America to “unite itself against Yankee imperialism.” One of the paragraphs reads: “The United States today controls Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama. Tomorrow it is going to control Central America. It has commenced to control Mexico. Who says that it will not continue still further?” The article ends with a spirited plea to the Latin-American republics to help Mexico out of the hole into which she has got herself by her revolutionary civil war.

In its issue of September 15, 1913, in the same conspicuous position under the heading, “The Voice of a Mexican,” La Prensa reprints an article from La Revista, of Yucatan,
signed by R. De Zayas Enriques, in which he criticises severely our attitude of mentor of the Latin-American republics, and our pretention of being the only arbiter of their fate. He refers to the increasing application of the Monroe Doctrine, which, he says, is already too ample, and refers to the fact that European powers have always paid better respect to the Doctrine than the American peoples themselves. The whole trend of this two-column article is to arouse feeling against the United States.

Recent travelers in South America, and several of our recently returned diplomats, tell the same story. But perhaps no one has put the situation more clearly than the recent Ambassador from England to the United States. It can hardly be denied that the United States has no better friend than Mr. Bryce. In his American Commonwealth, he has shown a depth of sympathy and a keenness of appreciation for our institutions which have never been surpassed. His residence in Washington as the British Ambassador increased his already great popularity in this country. His advice is worth heeding, if we heed the advice of our friends at all. In his recent book on South America, he says:

As regards the United States there is a balance between attraction and suspicion. The South Americans desire to be on good terms with her, and their wisest statesmen feel the value of her diplomatic action in trying to preserve peace between those of their republics whose smouldering enmities often threaten to burst into flame. More than once in recent years this value has been tested. On the other hand, as has already been observed, they are jealous of their own dignity, not at all disposed to be patronized, and quick to resent anything bordering on a threat, even when addressed not to themselves, but to some other republic. It is as the disinterested, the absolutely disinterested and unselfish, advocate of peace and good-will, that the United States will have most influence in the western hemisphere, and that influence, gently and tactfully used, may be of incalculable service to mankind.

Surely, this must be our ultimate aim. We do desire to influence for good the western hemisphere. We are beginning to realize that there are several states in South America that are no longer infant republics. They have grown
up. To return to our former metaphor—the little swimmers have got their heads well out of water, and have climbed out and are safely standing on their own legs. They naturally resent any implied assertion on our part that we will protect them from Europe.

If the Monroe Doctrine implies this we-will-protect-you-from-Europe attitude, if it is disagreeable and irritating to those whose friendship is most worth having in the western hemisphere, if, as a matter of fact, we have deliberately broken the Monroe Doctrine whenever it suited us to do so, why should we cling to it so tenderly and so tenaciously any longer? What possible good can it do us? We apparently have a great deal to lose by maintaining it. What have we to gain by pretending to stick to it?

The chief arguments in favor of retaining the Monroe Doctrine appear to be three:

The first is, that the good old Doctrine is ninety years of age; it has survived and flourished nearly a century, and there must be something in it to have given it such a long life! To such an argument as this, it is only necessary to reply that the same notion was used with even more telling effect against Copernicus, when he declared that the world revolved on its axis. Furthermore, it sounds suspiciously like the defence that we made of slavery in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is an argument that need not be treated seriously.

In the second place, it is claimed that the Monroe Doctrine should be maintained because we have more interests in America than has Europe. "We are remote from Europe; we are close to South America." Therefore, it is natural that we should have more interest than England or Germany in maintaining a benevolent protection over the fortunes of the Latin-American republics. This may be true of the countries in the vicinity of the Caribbean Sea, but it is far from true of the larger republics of South America. Their great cities are geographically nearer Europe than they are to the United States. Their population contains at least a million Italian immigrants, and many hundreds of thousands of Spanish, Portuguese, French,
Germans, and English. While there are probably fewer French than those of any other nationality, the French actually outnumber the citizens of the United States who are living in the larger republics. Consequently, if there is any weight whatever in the fact that a nation has interests in a country where its citizens are employed, our interests are less than those of almost any one of the larger European countries. So far as investments are concerned, there is also no question whatever but that Europe has far more of a claim to be directly interested in the present state and future of the South American republics than has the United States. Compared to the hundreds of millions which England has invested in Argentina and Brazil, for instance, our own investments in those countries are ridiculously small. Consequently, this argument falls of its own weight, for to it we can reply that the larger and more important part of South America is nearer in miles, nearer in days of traveling, closer in ties of relationship, and more directly interested in commercial intercourse with Europe than with the United States.

The third argument is that the Monroe Doctrine has done South America a great deal of good in preventing her from being partitioned, as was Africa. Therefore, let us preserve it in all its pristine strength! It is quite true that the Monroe Doctrine undoubtedly protected South America against European aggression during a large part of the nineteenth century, when such aggression might have been fatal to the independence of several South American republics. But such a condition of affairs no longer exists, and if it should arise, that is to say if Germany should attempt to seize part of Brazil, for instance, or if Japan or China should attempt to coerce Peru into receiving undesirable immigrants, the best course for us to pursue would be, not to step forth single-handed as we did in 1823, but to join hands with the leading nations of South America in protecting the new world from the aggression of the old. It is replied by some that this is merely a modification of the Monroe Doctrine. In so far as it aims to accomplish
certain results, that is true; in so far as it is promulgated in a different spirit and with a direct recognition of the actual state of our southern neighbors, it is different. Taking into account the extremely unpleasant connotation, in the ears of our southern neighbors, of the word Monroeism, we should be in a much stronger position if we would put that word aside, and adopt a new one, such as Pan-American Defense, which shall have for its connotation America for Humanity, and not America for the North Americans.

Having considered the chief arguments for retaining the Monroe Doctrine, let us now briefly sum up the reasons why we should abandon it. First, the original Monroe Doctrine has been disregarded in several historical instances, notably after our war with Mexico in 1847, after our war with Spain in 1898, and in our dealings with Colombia, Santo Domingo, and Nicaragua. Second, owing to the constitutional changes that have taken place in the leading European nations since 1823, there is no danger that, in the words of President Monroe, the allied powers will “extend their political system to any portion of either continent.” The world has advanced since then and the European nations themselves would be the first to object to any one of their number seizing a Latin-American republic, or setting up a monarchy there. Third, several of the South American states, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, having attained their majority are no longer infants, do not need our protection and will make better friends and stronger allies if we cease to hold the Monroe Doctrine as one of the tenets of our political faith. Fourth, their friendship is worth having. They are already building super-dreadnoughts, and, with our more extended frontier, and our outlying ports, such as Panama and Honolulu, we need cordial friends in the western hemisphere, and cannot afford to treat them in such a way as to estrange their sentiments. Fifth, the later form of the Monroe Doctrine, sometimes known as the “Big stick policy,” or the “American policeman idea,” by which we say to Europe that we cannot allow her to take any active interest in the political affairs of the
western hemisphere, and accept the corresponding responsibility to look after her people and her property in the less well established republics, is a policy likely to involve us in tremendous difficulties and possibly in costly wars. It is a policy from which we have nothing to gain, and in which we have everything to lose. It is a policy which is likely to cost us the friendship not only of our American neighbors but, what is really of more importance to us, our European neighbors. Sixth, we should give up the Monroe Doctrine because the premises on which it was founded, and on which it was justified, no longer exist.

Today Europe has more citizens in South America than we have. She has invested a far larger share of her capital in South America than we have. She is bound to South America, not only by these ties of brotherhood and of property, but also by the racial ties which bind together the Latin race.

Geographically, Europe is nearer the chief cities of South America than is the United States; racially, she is closer; practically, she has more business interests there, and more of her sons are living there; and, finally, Europe has no intention to enforcing arbitrary monarchy and despotism on American states any more than we have.

As the premises on which the Monroe Doctrine was based no longer exist, and as the maintenance of our adherence to those words is of harm rather than good to us, it must be evident that the time has arrived for us to abandon this national shibboleth, and to clear the way for a new and logical foreign policy.

If we abandon the Monroe Doctrine, what shall we adopt to take its place? The answer to this question is fairly simple if one is willing to admit that the words "Monroe Doctrine" simply stand for our foreign policy. Under President Monroe, we announced it as our foreign policy to have nothing to do with Europe, and to see to it that Europe had nothing to do with America. We had a kind of splendid isolation. We were separated from Europe by a stormy ocean, which could be crossed only by a painful
journey on board small sailing vessels. We promulgated a doctrine intended to keep foreign complications out of our national life, and to enable us to avoid entangling alliances. Today, as was recently said in an editorial in the World's Work, this very Monroe Doctrine is the chief breeder of diplomatic negotiations. In other words, it is a troublemaker. To take its place, let us adopt a more rational foreign policy. We have already begun to do so. President Wilson, in his Mobile declaration, stated clearly that the United States did not intend to take another foot of territory by conquest. He has declined to send an army into Mexico, although there have been loud clamors for intervention, and many of these clamors, particularly in the yellow journals, have been based upon the so-called "logic of the Monroe Doctrine." But we must go a few steps further if we would make our friends in South America believe that we have really adopted a new foreign policy, and that we have outgrown Monroeism.

One of these steps was recommended by Prof. Theodore Woolsey in an able article in Scribner's Magazine in 1909, in which it was proposed that we invite the leading powers of Latin-America to unite with us whenever intervention became necessary. This principle of joint intervention attracted little attention at that time, but its practicability has been rapidly gaining force recently. In 1911, the present writer, in a book entitled Across South America, suggested that the time had come to "amend our outgrown Monroe Doctrine, as has already been suggested by one of our writers on international law, so as to include in the police force of the western hemisphere, those who have shown themselves able to practice self-control." This suggestion was given favorable notice by Mr. Bryce in his book on South America just referred to. It was again called to public attention by the Hon. Charles Sherrill, recently our Minister to Argentina, and has since been referred to many times both in print and on the platform.

Some of those who have sanctioned it, feeling that it was necessary to stick to the words of our ancient shibboleth,
have felt that the invitation to Argentina or Brazil to intervene with us in Mexico, should come under the cloak of the Monroe Doctrine; but it seems to me that this is a most unfortunate suggestion. It is to our interests,—it is in the interests of the peace and happiness of the western hemisphere, that we get as far away from these words "Monroe Doctrine" as possible, and that we build up a new foreign policy that is abreast of the times, that recognizes the greatness of several of the Latin-American states, that recognizes that some of them are weak, and need the protection of an international police, and that gives evidence to the world that our foreign policy is really unselfish and is based on high ideals. As a matter of fact, we are a peaceful nation. Our desire to be helpful to our neighbors is sincere. The present administration has given evidence of its intention to discount revolution and to give the aid of its formal recognition only to such governments as are constitutionally elected. We are not going to put a premium on revolution by promptly recognizing any government that comes to the top in the seething cauldron of unstable conditions in any Latin-American country. This is a doctrine of high ideals. It has nothing whatever to do with the Monroe Doctrine.

Furthermore, there are several minor things of practical importance which we can do to show not only that we have abandoned the Monroe Doctrine, but that we have adopted a legitimate new foreign policy. In the first place, by offering to exchange ambassadors with Argentina and Chile, we can give them evidence that we realize their present position in the world today. There is no reason why we should have ambassadors in Brazil, Mexico, and Turkey, and none in Argentina and Chile.

In the second place, we can make a generous appropriation for the second Pan-American Scientific Congress. We can at least offer to treat our international guests as hospitably as Chile did. In fact, in order to make up for lost time and for the seeming insolence due to our negligence, we can afford to do better than they did. And we ought to do it promptly.

In the third place, we can show our personal interest in
our neighbors by visiting them more frequently. There are no longer any serious handicaps in the way of visiting a number of the states of South America. By becoming intimately acquainted with the problems of Peru, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, we can do more toward aiding in the formation of an intelligent foreign policy than might appear at first sight. It is ignorance that breeds insults.

Finally, let us stop using the words “Monroe Doctrine.” It would be well if a formal resolution of Congress could be passed, but since Congress has never formally approved of the Monroe Doctrine in so many words, it is probable that it would be sufficient if our great parties in their next platforms should avoid the repetition of those phrases supporting the doctrine which have been customary for so many years.

For the immediate future, let us adopt a policy of Pan-American Defense. Let us invite to the round table of discussion all the American republics who can show clean records and economic stability. If we believe that any American republic, by reason of civil war or internal discord, is endangering the peace of its neighbors, if we believe that cause for interference in its affairs is arising, let the matter be considered at the round table. Let it meet in some one of the American capitals, not merely to discuss, as Pan-American conferences have done, innocuous policies regarding Pan-American railway projects and international postal regulations, but the actual business in hand. In other words, let these Pan-American conferences not represent a formal exchange of pleasantries every so often, but let them be called for the definite object of settling definite and difficult problems. If there is to be any intervention, let it come as the result of a family gathering, and not as the decision of the American Department of State. Let us remember that it is “as the disinterested advocate of peace and good-will that we shall have most influence in the Western Hemisphere.”

If Argentina, Brazil and Chile decline to meet us on these terms, then let us go to The Hague and call a council of all civilized nations, and ask for an expression of interna-
tional opinion, and the appointment of international police. Here is an opportunity for a truly enlightened international policy.

Meanwhile let us not forget that the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine involves an attitude of constant suspicion both at home and abroad, which raises barriers against the progress of international good-will and diminishes our influence both in Europe and America.